Village Journals
Resonate your identity with Naseeb journals. Express your opinions, share your thoughts, post your writings and connect with like minded people through the power of expression.
Resonate your identity with Naseeb journals. Express your opinions, share your thoughts, post your writings and connect with like minded people through the power of expression.
What Makes You, You?
If I where to take you, anesthisise you, and download your mind, completely, along with your memories, both those we traditionally consider such, like your memories of your past birthdays, of you mothers goodbye when you went to college, of your pets, your friends, your life, and the memories stored more remotely, in your body, how to light a lighter, how to bait a fishing hook, how to juggle, how to tie a tie correctly and how to make a sandwhich while speaking on the phone.
The memories stored in your body, in your muscles, in your joints. The memories you store in your senses that you never pay attention too and only access directly on few occasions.
The memory that wakes you from bed and has you grasping for your ringing phone with one hand, and reaching for your glasses with the other, without you thinking about either action. The memories that cause your mouth to water when you smell certain scents, and your nose to crinkle when you smell others, the memory that you, as a human, where born with. If I took your instincts, that made you human and that all humans share a fear of spiders, a fear of the night, a fear of sudden loud noises, of large onrushing animals, and I perfectly replicated your version of those instincts, that you overcame your fear of spiders, and now find them intriguing, or that you generalized it to include ants, octopuses, and slugs. If I took all the nuances, quirks, absurdities, beliefs, logical errors, and thought patterns that define your entirety to this point, anesthetized you, and downloaded all that information into a computer program that woke up knowing it was in a computer but wholely believing that it was a continuation of you. Would that program be you?
And why not?
If I where to awaken your body, full and functional, with mental process intact and whole, and proceeded to amputate your limbs, perform a block transplant of your internal organs, remove your kidneys, and replace their function with a dialysis machine, remove your heart and replace it with an entirely mechanical one, transfuse drain and transfuse all your blood and serum, block the cerebral foramen and place stents to take their function, transplant your corneas, remove and graft your skin with that of another, and wipe out your bone marrow and replace it with that of a donor. If I where to, in short, replace every replaceable organic part of you that can be replaced with inorganics, and replace every organic part of you with that of another person, and then I where to ask you, which if the two beings, the wholely programmed one, or the wholly altered one, who share all the same memories, all the quirks of one another, is you, which would it be?
And why?
If now, time took it?s course, and you became demented, and you lost your memories, lost your past, lost your abilities, your distinctive gait, your limp, the funny way you scratch your nose when you are confused, if you aged in a body that was largely not your own, and the computer lived it?s life in a body also entirely artificial. At what point could we claim the computer is a better example of whom you are, than you yourself?
Why would the computer not have a claim on your persona? Because it is a copy? What if after the transfer ws complete, we destroyed your physical body, and only left you in the computer, your mind, memories, instincts, behaviors and all, and, as we said before, the computer version fully believes itself to be you, a perfect continuation of whom you are.
Would it now have that claim?
Why not?
Why would the computer, who is mentally you in every sense, and only lacks your physical body not have a stronger clain on being the original than yourself, who is degrading mentally, and who largely lacks its own original body.
What makes you, you?
The memories stored in your body, in your muscles, in your joints. The memories you store in your senses that you never pay attention too and only access directly on few occasions.
The memory that wakes you from bed and has you grasping for your ringing phone with one hand, and reaching for your glasses with the other, without you thinking about either action. The memories that cause your mouth to water when you smell certain scents, and your nose to crinkle when you smell others, the memory that you, as a human, where born with. If I took your instincts, that made you human and that all humans share a fear of spiders, a fear of the night, a fear of sudden loud noises, of large onrushing animals, and I perfectly replicated your version of those instincts, that you overcame your fear of spiders, and now find them intriguing, or that you generalized it to include ants, octopuses, and slugs. If I took all the nuances, quirks, absurdities, beliefs, logical errors, and thought patterns that define your entirety to this point, anesthetized you, and downloaded all that information into a computer program that woke up knowing it was in a computer but wholely believing that it was a continuation of you. Would that program be you?
And why not?
If I where to awaken your body, full and functional, with mental process intact and whole, and proceeded to amputate your limbs, perform a block transplant of your internal organs, remove your kidneys, and replace their function with a dialysis machine, remove your heart and replace it with an entirely mechanical one, transfuse drain and transfuse all your blood and serum, block the cerebral foramen and place stents to take their function, transplant your corneas, remove and graft your skin with that of another, and wipe out your bone marrow and replace it with that of a donor. If I where to, in short, replace every replaceable organic part of you that can be replaced with inorganics, and replace every organic part of you with that of another person, and then I where to ask you, which if the two beings, the wholely programmed one, or the wholly altered one, who share all the same memories, all the quirks of one another, is you, which would it be?
And why?
If now, time took it?s course, and you became demented, and you lost your memories, lost your past, lost your abilities, your distinctive gait, your limp, the funny way you scratch your nose when you are confused, if you aged in a body that was largely not your own, and the computer lived it?s life in a body also entirely artificial. At what point could we claim the computer is a better example of whom you are, than you yourself?
Why would the computer not have a claim on your persona? Because it is a copy? What if after the transfer ws complete, we destroyed your physical body, and only left you in the computer, your mind, memories, instincts, behaviors and all, and, as we said before, the computer version fully believes itself to be you, a perfect continuation of whom you are.
Would it now have that claim?
Why not?
Why would the computer, who is mentally you in every sense, and only lacks your physical body not have a stronger clain on being the original than yourself, who is degrading mentally, and who largely lacks its own original body.
What makes you, you?
Comments on this journal
Slavoj ?i?ek - The Reality of the Virtual (Part 1/8) uk.youtube.com
My argument is not to imply that I necessarily regard every patient suffering an abnormal state of consciousness (e.g., stupor, amnesia, anencephaly, coma, persistent vegetative state, locked-in syndrome, and brain death) or any other bizarre disorder characteristic of an altered state of consciousness as dead, non-human, or less than human, and that I therefore refuse to grant the patient ?rights of sentience.? What I claim is that an attempt, independent of divine support, to create a fully functional and conscious artificial replica of a divinely created human would inevitably be an unfeasible impasse. And my claim is intended to be independent of whether the aforesaid patients are regarded as normal, abnormal, alive, dead, pseudo-dead, unconscious, selfless, asleep, awake, half-awake, dreaming, machine, soul, non-human, or less than human.
>> even babies born without brains ? (ancephaly?) even those demented beyound reason? comatose beyond any outword appearance of life?
>> does the rooh remain intil the heart stops? or the brain? does it enter with the beating of a fetal heart? or the first electonic signals from a fetal mind? (again, ancephalic children will never have these signals)
>> so what parts would you need to be missing before an ohterwise human, human, also no longer has this rooh?
Answers are either unknown or are irrelevant to my previous argument. I will explain why my two-fold conclusion in the previous post is meant to stand true regardless of the unsolved mind-problem plaguing a conclusive solution to these questions.
By no means do I claim to have conclusive answers to these questions because fundamentally inherent in the questions is the unsolved mind-body problem. Complicating the crisis further is the conflict between dualist (mind and body are separate) and physicalist (mind has physical basis in matter) models of the mind. Indeed, I will not hesitate to elaborate your queries further with a few more examples of unsolved mysteries to which I have no sound answers acceptable to mainstream science. We don?t know when the mind (?rooh,? soul, consciousness, vital element, or whatever is deemed the ?mind?) comes into being during prenatal development, how it departs from the body, what actually happens in NDE (near-death experiences) and OBE (out-of-body) cases, what actually happens to the mind during pseudo-death, how mind affects matter, what kind of medium (if not physical medium) consciousness thrives in, to what extent infants experience various internal mental states in the case of dysfunctional or anencephalic brain, and so on. The cases of near-death experiences (NDEs) provoke similar ethical questions as do the cases of anencephaly. The apparent ethical issues in these cases reflect our gap in full understanding of the mind.
In ?Facing up to the Problem of Consciousness? published in Journal of Consciousness Studies in 1995, the renowned philosopher David Chalmers wrote that "onsciousness poses the most baffling problems in the science of the mind" and that "here is nothing that we know more intimately than conscious experience, but there is nothing that is harder to explain." We do not seem to fully understand such decisive subjects as the nature of the mind, precisely how mind and matter (material brain or body) interact, how to define death, whether it is fair to declare anencephalic or comatose patients dead or less than fully human, and so on. It may not be so easy to differentiate the mind from the body, and that is where part of the problem lies. Until the mind-body problem is solved, I feel safe to assume that the dispute on what really constitutes the mind and on the ensuing ethical dilemmas in clinical medicine will likely continue.
However, my previous argument is independent of these unknowns pertaining to the mind-body problem. All I argue is that since you or I cannot replicate the ?rooh,? on which other faculties of consciousness and free will may be contingent, you or I cannot create a genuine replica of another human. Therefore, I claim, that your questions, though intriguing in philosophical principle, assume the practically impossible. If something is impossible to achieve, then the ethical questions that arise from imaginary achievement of the impossible possess no practical or ethical relevance.
Creating a complete, genuine replica of a human is impossible for another reason. To have accomplished the feat is to have become a Creator like God with a big ?C? according to Quranic verses 21:21 and 46:4. Humans have been challenged to create, but they will never be able to create or become the Creator. But your hypothetical argument leads to the implication that by producing from certain building blocks of matter another human with full faculties of the mind (a much more audacious feat not be confused with mere ?cloning? of another human), one will have truly created a human and will have become the Creator. But there is only one Creator ? the one that created us.
In essence, you deem it possible to become the Creator, and then you pose the questions such as ?are you still within your rights to determine it has no claims to sentience?? The question has no practical relevance because what is actually impossible has been deemed, through imagination or unsupported assumptions, possible or achievable.
>> if something you make immitates life so perfectly that it believes in it's artificial heart of hearts that it too should be granted the rights of man, that it also wishes to kneel in prayer with you, to fast during ramadan, to contemplate the glory of God, do good and forbid evil.
There has to be a distinction between matter and mind unless you subscribe to the physicalist view. But support for physicalism is not without opposing support for dualism. You say: replicate heart, kidneys, and all the rest of matter, and even ?consciousness.? But is consciousness in matter or in some other non-physical realm? How would you replicate consciousness if it resides in a non-physical medium? Do you have full access to non-physical or spiritual realm so that you may replicate the consciousness of the material form of a human that resides in this plane of existence? These hard issues are not clarified; yet, it is conveniently claimed that consciousness may be replicated.
It is an unsupported assumption that once this material human-imitation is brought into being, the mind (?rooh,? soul, consciousness, vital element, or whatever is deemed the ?mind?), on which the being?s ?belief,? ?wish,? ?sentience,? sense of morality, free will, memory, judgment, and other things may be contingent, would automatically prop into existence and that the imitation would then enjoy the flowers, fear spiders and loud noises, believe in God, kneel in prayer and fast during Ramadan, and so on. I would not to be surpised if all that is produced is just flesh, bones, and blood, though fully functional. But such a colossal feat in creating a human, if successful, would effectively qualify you as a Creator and would falsify the idea that God is the only Creator, as He is deemed in the Quran. But God Himself has challenged humans to accomplish the feat and has guaranteed that they would fail. Therefore, you or I cannot create a human or a replica of a pre-existing or a dead human.
In sum, I claim the following in conclusion: (1) You or I cannot create a human or a replica of a pre-existing or a dead human (impossible feat), and (2) As a consequence of #1, the ethical questions that arise from imaginary achievement of the impossible feat pose no practical or ethical relevance. This two-fold conclusion is meant to stand true regardless of unknown or incomplete resolutions to the questions about anencephaly, coma, NDE, OBE, pseudo-death, and other unsolved mysteries of the mind-body problem. I might be arguing from a more practical standpoint about what is actually feasible based on current understanding, but what I have been presented is a hypothetical standpoint with some assumptions. Although the ethical concerns on the issues are definitely worthy of your concerned sympathy and consideration, which I have a high regard for, the concerns are nonetheless unrelated to my argument. If you intend to promote a pro-life argument (which I do value) for those suffering disorders such as anencephaly and coma, then erecting imaginary achievement of the impossible feat and then posing the ensuing ethical dilemmas does not seem to be the best approach.
I enjoyed reading your post from the perspective of the question "What makes you, you," which I do believe is a legitimate question worth further examination. The question points well to the crux of the concept of "self" in the mind-body problem. But what I claim is that the idea that a human is fully replicable in all its grandeur designed by the Creator is unsupported.
wow, i'm extremely impressed by both of you.
so, no matter how perfectly human-like the program, no matter what it believes of itself, that it is sentient, that it is alive, that it grows and lives and expereinces, that it is consiouse, to itself at the very least, it cannot claim any rights of sentience as long as it is not Human/Organic?
is this right of conciousness given to all humans and held by all humans from birth to death?
even babies born without brains ? (ancephaly?) even those demented beyound reason? comatose beyond any outword appearance of life?
does the rooh remain intil the heart stops? or the brain? does it enter with the beating of a fetal heart? or the first electonic signals from a fetal mind? (again, ancephalic children will never have these signals)
if something you make immitates life so perfectly that it believes in it's artificial heart of hearts that it too should be granted the rights of man, that it also wishes to kneel in prayer with you, to fast during ramadan, to contemplate the glory of God, do good and forbid evil.
are you still within your rights to determine it has no claims to sentience?
you clearly don't think it can claim any rights over you, an argument you make based on it being artificial creation, it lacks a certain something, something bigger than the sum of the parts that we have, but could not hope to transmit or copy.
so what parts would you need to be missing before an ohterwise human, human, also no longer has this rooh?
eyes too see? ears too hear? hearts that beat? a mechanical heart does not negate your rights as self-determining man. artificial kidney, and transplanted organs would not either.
this computer, remember, believes itself to be you, it has your previous history, and has your same ability to move forward in it's life. can it claim this right? it would suggest that it is you, that it only happens to have artificial existance.
much as you can have an artificial hip, heart, or kidney.
But what exactly is human ?consciousness?? What does it mean for a human to be fully ?conscious?? What is a ?mind?? Before examining the questions in the post above, the term ?consciousness? has to be elaborated. Human consciousness incorporates, among other things, the modality of the internal mental experience of free will.
The following verses from the Quran come to mind:
(15:28-29) ?When your Lord said to the angels, "I will create the human being out of pure mud-moulded clay. When it is properly shaped and I have blown My Spirit (?rooh?) into it, you should then bow down in prostration.?
(32:7-9) ?It is He Who created everything in the best manner and began the creation of the human being from clay. He made His offspring come into existence from an extract of insignificant fluid, then He gave it proper shape and blew His Spirit (?rooh?) in it. He made ears, eyes and hearts for you, but you give Him very little thanks.?
Therefore, a human is not a pure automaton running solely on matter-energy. Note that a differentiation is called out between the ?shape? (mere anatomy and physiology such as ears, eyes, and hearts) and the ?spirit.?
How would one program or model a divine ?rooh? that is also part of what is human? If this spirit (?rooh?) that makes up a human cannot be artificially modeled by a computer algorithm, or otherwise downloaded, represented, or programmed into another form of matter-energy or quantum mechanical wave function or into any other form of existence, then a replication of the ?self? that perfectly captures its material functions (bood flow in kidneys, electrical firing of neurons in the brain, genetic foundation, susceptibility to disease, etc.), can nonetheless fail to possess the complete, genuine properties of the self, which is endowed with inimitable divine ?rooh.?
The ?rooh? may very well be a pivotal factor that influences key human modalities, including the internal mental experience or perception of free will. A human?s actions are accompanied by conscious self-awareness of free will, which is an internal mental state of consciousness. I feel a certain modality of perception with free will. Would a synthetic ?replica? of the self be endowed with the modality of internal mental experience of free will? How would one know for sure - question the being?
If the internal mental experience of the free will of the original self cannot be replicated, then the consciousness of the self cannot be said to be fully replicated. Further, if the ?rooh,? on which the modality of free will may very well be contingent, cannot be replicated, then the like of the following questions is analogous to asking, ?Is a square a circle??:
?would the computer, who considers itself me, have a right to discontnue life support??
?Why would the computer not have a claim on your persona? Because it is a copy??
A computer-generated artificial intelligence (AI) has to possess, in addition to information or computation-based material replication, the internal mental experience of subjective modalities, which may be contingent on the ?rooh,? such as the internal mental experience of free will of the original self - a quandary that among other things is part of the present contention about the mind-body problem as applied to Strong AI.
Contrary to my analysis above, the materialistic view, which grants no other reality beyond atoms or strings, supposes that all properties of the human modality could very well be authentically modeled by an algorithm or by some other manipulation of space-time fabric.
interesting.
if the two believed they where the same person up to a given point, and then took seperate courses, the consiousness in the computer beleiving itself to be Me, transported to a virtual world (rather than a mere virtual copy of me), while my body continues to degrade in this world, fully believing i am my own creature.
the question wonder about, is this (and this might seem wierd or cold hearted to you )
as i age, and become demented, loose my memories, my personality, my understanding of myself, and even largely, my sentience.
would the computer, who considers itself me, have a right to discontnue life support? would i have the right to delete the computer program?
"my" consiousness would go one in the computer, sentient as i myself was in my prime, ever learning and changing, but the consiousness contained in my own body would die with the body.
but would this imply that "my" consiousness lives on?
have i becoem eternal and immortal, even as i prove mortality ?
(ps i'm gonna cut and paste your response to my journal, i liked it, i'm gonna keep it)
And furthermore, just for ammusement, if such a situation occured where two entities believe themselves to be the same person, then there can be two possbilities. 1) Either they believe each other to be distributed parts of the same person and hence accept each other, in which case they are actually the same person. Or 2) they each "individually" believe they are the person the "other" claims to be, in which case they are really not the same person. From this point on they will probably have different development paths. There are further possibilities coming to my mind, but I'll end with this. In the second case, if a conflict occured between the two identical persons with no way to prove who is who, the stronger one would probably eliminate the weaker, hence ending the conflict.