By way of Recommendations following its Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law, HRW calls on the government of Lebanon to interdict the delivery of rockets to Hezbollah and implies it should disarm the Lebanese Resistance. This HRW demand constitutes interference in the internal affairs of Lebanon. It is for the Lebanese government, not Israel or HRW to decide how its country defends itself.

HRW's recent use of harsh, narrow, legalistic judgments on the Palestinian and Lebanese resistance suggests that it has been willing to trim its sails under pressure from the Israeli lobby and as a consequence it may have lost its moral compass and betrayed its mandate.


- Source: Al-Manar, 04/09/2007.

If HRW is not able or willing to provide maps showing the position of Israeli bases in relation to targeting by Hezbollah it should withdraw its unsupported accusation.

Does HRW believe that there exists moral, political, or legal parity between someone who tries to kill another and the response of the victim attempting to stop the continuing life endangering attacks? HRW charges that Hezbollah "repeatedly bombarded cities, towns, and villages without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians and military objectives". What probative, relevant, and material evidence does HRW have concerning the actual firings logs of Hezbollah, and what a particular target was at the time of firing and whether or not Hezbollah acted "without any apparent effort to distinguish between civilians and military objectives?"

HRW builds it case on language such as "In some of those cases, we could find no evidence there had been a legitimate military target in the vicinity at the time of the attack, suggesting it was a deliberate attack on civilians.

HRW ignored Israeli use of Human Shields

The record of military actions during the July War suggests that Hezbollah may well have known exactly where Israeli military installations were placed and monitored the movement and placement of Israeli mobile positions and launchers before it fired rockets. HRW admits this possibility but avoids the conclusion that Hezbollah had the right to target Lebanon-bound rockets from Israel as long as the military necessity outweighed risk to civilians.
HRW also condemns Hezbollah for firing on Kiryat Shmona but omits mention of the real possibility that Israel did have mobile military sites in that and more than 20 other locations where civilians were nearby. HRW offers no proof that Hezbollah purposely targeted civilians. It leaves to one footnote the mention that Hezbollah urged civilians to leave the area of the Israeli bases and move south out of danger and that Sayed Nasrallah pleaded for residents to move south and away from Israel positions, declaring that "your blood is our blood."

International Law

That there are problems with the enforcement of international law is well known. Also there are some issues that need the attention of an International Conference on Revisions of The Laws of Armed Conflict. One subject that requires attention and discussion is the one raised during the July War by Hezbollah's Secretary-General Sayed Hasan Nasrallah, expressed thus:
"As long as the enemy undertakes its aggression without limits or red lines, we will respond without limits or red lines".
This statement mirrors international practice. Should it be codified by convention? Does it accurately reflect international customary law? Certainly the history of warfare reveals that virtually every army has used retaliation, sometimes massively. Dresden, Coventry, Berlin come to mind.
Were there errors in firing rockets by Hezbollah? Certainly. The Lebanese Resistance readily admits this.
Should HRW's claim that Hezbollah purposely targeted civilian be credited? Not based on the evidence it tenders.

Israel certainly thought so when it dropped scores of thousands of threatening leaflets, sent threatening text messages to Lebanese phones, broke into TV and radio broadcasts and generally tried to gain military advantage by unnerving its opponents. Moreover, Hezbollah threats had the effect of sending tens of thousands of civilians out of harms way. That was one of their objectives. By contrast Israel warned civilians to leave and then bombed them as they fled. This occurred at Marwahin on July 15, at Aitaroun on July 16, on a minibus in the Bekaa Valley on August 10th and on more than one dozen other occasions.
Did not the Lebanese Resistance have a right to use psychological tactics and increase pressure on Israeli authorities to end their attacks by suggesting it had surprises and intended to match the level of response to Israeli attacks? The psychological tactics used by Israel and Hezbollah during the July War were not illegal under international law.

"Hezbollah's attacks in violation of the laws of war, when combined with such statements indicating criminal intent, is strong evidence that some Hezbollah members and commanders were responsible for war crimes." HRW concludes there was a violation of international law and then finds criminal intent by joining certain use of puffing or verbal psychological warfare tactics by Hezbollah in press releases including threats to Israeli military authorities' regarding possible attacks on certain areas if Israel did not stop its carpet bombing of Lebanon. Concluding that these elements somehow "renders Hezbollah members and commanders responsible for war crimes" is not an accurate reading of international customary law or treaty law. Words in this context and on the facts HRW offer do not establish criminal intent.
As Hezbollah leaders have stated, especially in its experience with Israel and in asymmetrical warfare theatres, psychological warfare is increasingly important in dealing with Israel military and political leaders.

HRW fails to sufficiently acknowledge or weigh in the fact that in the north of Palestine, fixed military facilities, such as IDF bases, are located next to or in the midst of civilian settlements i.e. the IDF's frequent use of human shields. For example it is well known that the IDF northern command headquarters is located near the city center of Safed. Also, the Israeli navy has a major training base on the Haifa waterfront, next to a major hospital and a neighborhood of low-rise apartment buildings.

"Given the sensitive, even tense atmosphere in Lebanon/Palestine of which HRW is well aware, it would have been preferable for HRW to issue one comprehensive Report containing all its findings and not singling out one side in the absence of the other". F. Lamb
One of HRW's most egregious conclusions and misstatements of international law is the following:

"Citing national security concerns, Israeli military authorities limited the amount of information publicly available (to HRW) about various aspects of the war, including certain information on where Hezbollah rockets landed during the conflict. These restrictions limited our ability to fully investigate the pattern of Hezbollah attacks. HRW complained in its Report that "Israeli censors did not allow HRW researchers permission to report missile hits at IDF bases and/or strategic facilities, or the location of those facilities".
The fact that the Israeli military did not make it easy for Human Rights Watch to gather evidence they were seeking or apparently hoping for does not justify HRW filling in evidentiary gaps or imagined evidence and then use that speculation to issue an international indictment against Lebanon and its resistance . HRW admitted that Hezbollah's claims that its rockets had hit military targets inside Israel more often than the media was reporting were true based on its own findings.

It is an approach crafted to achieve the desired result and which is sometimes based on legal fictions and misleading technicalities.

If the law is against their client's case the lawyer would likely zealously argue the facts in their clients favor. It is submitted that HRW, in the Report under review argues technical aspects and certain selected international legal principles it views in Israel's favor. It chose this lawyerly approach because the facts of the July 2006 War overwhelmingly and incontrovertibly support Lebanon, the Lebanese Resistance and the civilian victims in Lebanon rather than Israel's actions.

Some examples:

Throughout its Report, HRW explains and tries to excuse its lack of prohibitive evidence by blaming Israeli censorship:

The timing of the release of the Report led many observers to believe HRW "was spreading false publicity against Lebanon and weakening the national spirit." One official Lebanese Judicial report on August 30, 2007 accused HRW of attempting to "prevent the resistance from protecting its country against Israeli assaults and violating Lebanon's sovereignty." The following comment argues that HRW has taken the same skewed approach to Israeli actions in Lebanon during the 2006 July war, as it has increasingly done in Palestine. HRW's view of the law and the facts with respect to the Lebanese Resistance's right of self defense during the July 2006 War. Most lawyers, if their case is quite weak on the facts, may, when preparing to argue their clients case in Court, stress to the Court and especially the Jurors, the heavy and solemn weight and technical aspects of applicable legal principles, standards and rules. They will sometimes tell the Jurors that their own personal feelings and intuition do not count and must not interfere with what the law, in the opinion of the advocate, requires.