We cannot allow ourselves to be caught in a virtual peace process, says Barak. Olmert, he adds, may be a seasoned politician, but he is not cut from the same leadership cloth as Begin, Rabin and Sharon.

When he comes back from Annapolis, it is doubtful that Olmert will have any tidings for us beyond, "I fly, therefore I am."

Barak denies that he is trying to undermine Olmert. If Olmert falls, it won't be Barak's doing. It will be his own. The difference between us is not a matter of right or left, he says. It's a matter of approach; of how much research you do before laying out a plan or a proposal that affects the life of the state. The happy-go-lucky approach that assumes everything will be fine is not the way to go. We saw something of that nonchalance this past summer.

The hopes of the Palestinians are sky-high, but at Annapolis everything could go boom. It's not just Barak. Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni thinks so, too. The moment the public sees what the Palestinians have in mind, support for the government is liable to disappear in a blink of an eye. Barak stresses that as chairman of Labor, he needs to get ready to take the wheel. While the road map was all content and no process, now we are looking at the reverse: process first, content later. There is nothing about "settlement blocs" in President Bush's book.

At a government meeting a few weeks ago, Olmert's buddies say, Barak spoke in general about the "need to act wisely," and "look before you leap." But on the subject of alternatives, his mouth stayed zipped shut. They believe this is a calculated move: He is deliberately sitting on the fence. As he sees the public veering rightward, he wants to steer Labor to a different place, closer to where Yitzhak Rabin was - right of center.

Barak does not say that Olmert's travels are worthless. All in all, he seems to be holding up rather well despite his troubles. With all the charges and investigations, he still functions during the day, although, "I'm not sure how well he sleeps at night." Barak describes Olmert as a talented man. We have an excellent relationship. I'm closer to Olmert than Shimon Peres was to Rabin.

There's something arrogant in the way he conducts himself, says Defense Minister Ehud Barak behind closed doors. It's not that he treats things lightly, but that he acts like a lawyer who knows his client might lose. Outwardly, Ehud and Ehud pretend to have a great relationship, but Olmert insiders suspect that Barak is out to delegitimize his leadership. First, there was his testimony before the Winograd Committee about how you don't go to war in an hour, then his thundering silence when the subject of the Annapolis summit came up, and finally, his comments that the summit was a "souffle" and the partners to it are not partners.

The trouble with Barak, they fume in the Olmert camp, is that he doesn't offer any alternative. In the end, those who refuse to sit down with Palestinian Authority Chairman Mahmoud Abbas will have to sit down with Hamas politburo leader Khaled Meshal. In another year and a quarter, America will have a new government, and most of the understandings with Bush could go up in smoke.

None of them - Brown, Sarkozy or Putin - need Prime Minister Ehud Olmert's advice on how to handle Iran. They will do what's good for them. On the other hand, Olmert probably got advice that was hard to refuse on the subject of an Israeli attack on Iran.

With three police investigations looming over his head, a personal friend forced to resign from the Finance Ministry on suspicion of embezzlement and grand larceny, and the final report of the Winograd Committee yet to come, Olmert wants to show those anticipating his downfall that he is the world's darling, and that he is all packed and ready for the Annapolis summit. Is he strong enough to commit to the evacuation of 100,000 settlers? Can he commit to an agreement with a weak Palestinian leadership? The answer is, probably not.