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An Everlasting Stumbling Block for Evolution


I believe that a notable materialist view, including that of the mechanistic process of evolution, is that the entire human, bacterial, viral, mammal, or any other organism's functionality may be modeled by an algorithm (i.e., by a software program) or "computer" (It is entirely irrelevant to the point here whether that could, in practice, be done or how difficult the brave project would be. The point to note is that, in theory, it is claimed that is possible). After all, the computer is often considered a model of the brain. Indeed, in many ways, it does function like a computer, but it is not entirely accurate to label the brain a computer since the brain is a lot more than a computer.

Consider our free will which, the evolutionists claim, emanates from the physical realm of the brain. Can we try to model the human functionality of free will by an algorithm, software program, or computer? I cannot see how we might do that because if I write a program, to the precise nano-bit, to duplicate you, your outward actions (whether you will finish reading this post, etc.), and your neural thoughts (whether you think I am a nut from the paranormal planet X, etc.), you can, through your free will, absolutely choose to do or think something ELSE, which was not written in my program. The whole concept of free will implies that the subject?s behavior remains unpredictable. Thus, if free will cannot be automated, is it justifiable to claim that, at least this particular unpredictable functionality of the human brain, is a product of the mechanistic evolutionary process? Is not free will entirely a non-material substrate that is not subject to the mechanism of evolution (mutation and natural selection)? Is it not, then, an error to claim that humans with free will evolved from their common ancestor, the first cell with no free will? I feel that free will is an everlasting stumbling block not only for evolution but also for the entire materialist outlook to try to account.
 

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Login to find out (March 5, 2007 at 5:15pm)
It seems that algorithmic and deterministic instructions are capable of producing indeterministic or unpredictable system output. For instance, a particular chess move of a computer is, for all practical purposes, indeterministic even though the broader algorithmic objective of the automaton is to win the game. Likewise, the output of a quantum computer may arguably be purely random or indeterministic, so much so that the output might not conform to a recognizable probability distribution. But is such indeterminism a sufficient criterion to regard the automaton chess contestant or the quantum computing random number generator as endowed with free will (not to imply that you stated so)? It is hard to conceive how algorithms with indeterministic outputs might elicit the sort of free will that we humans possess. The question really comes down to as to what the automaton chess genius or the quantum computing random number generator lacks that we humans with free will possess. I submit that the key missing variable is consciousness. Not only are our actions indeterministic but also our actions are accompanied by conscious self-awareness of free will, which is an internal mental state of experience. I feel a certain modality of perception with free will. I doubt that a classical or a quantum machine merely programmed to output indeterministic future behavior necessarily possesses an internal mental state of free will. In my previous post above, I overlooked this aspect of conscious experience inherent in human free will. It appears that the conscious experience of free will, not particularly the unpredictable aspect of free will, remains a stumbling block for the evolutionary mechanism. We have thus come full circle to the classic mind-body problem or to Chalmer?s hard problem of consciousness. I appreciate your remark for it has given me the opportunity to refine my position.

A few controversial, material mechanisms have indeed been proposed, showing how consciousness emerges from quantum computation and non-local quantum entanglement in the tubulin proteins of the brain?s microtubules (cf. Penrose-Hameroff?s Orch OR model of the brain). Still, the quantum models of the mind are far from making it justifiable to conceive naturalistic evolution of consciousness. In fact, Darwinists such as Richard Dawkins and Daniel Dennett have claimed to have demonstrated that free will is an illusion. If there exists a glorious property of a biological system that evolution has not been shown to produce, just demonstrate in painstaking detail how underlying physical mechanisms produce the property as an emergent illusion. Likewise, define biology as ?the study of complicated things that give the appearance of having been designed for a purpose? (cf. Dawkins' The Blind Watchmaker). Consider design a mere ?appearance? or effectively an illusion!
 
Login to find out (February 27, 2007 at 9:19pm)
Thanks for your thoughtful remarks to this and the Privileged Planet post. I will respond at a later convenience. Finally, it is good to see some dialogue in here ;)
 
Login to find out (February 27, 2007 at 10:35am)
interesting thought, although the invention of quantum computers (capable of generating truely random numbers) could have some effects on the 'freewill and unpredictability' bit ...