American Study: Hezbollah Had the Upper Hand
Andrew Exum
"Hezbollah at War": A Military Assessment done by Andrew Exum.
"Hezbollah at War": a military assessment which was done by the expert in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the former U.S Army officer Andrew Exum.
The assessment is mainly divided into three parts: Villages battle, Anti-tank battle and the Rockets battle. It also mentions Hezbollah's background, military structure, weapons and training in addition to the July War
Exum, who participated in Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, mentioned in his introduction that "what should stand out for U.S. military planners and policymakers as they study the July War is the simple fact that an army fighting with largely U.S. equipment and American-style tactics (Used by Israel) struggled greatly in its conflict with Hezbollah."
The former U.S. Army officer, who visited Lebanon and Palestine to continue his research, adds that "Hezbollah have infinitely more combat experience and acquired tactical nous than their Iranian sponsors, leading one independent observer to wryly note that Hezbollah trains Iran, not the other way around."
Exum adds that "As Hezbollah's performance during the July War illustrates, however, Hezbollah deserves to be taken seriously as a fighting force independent of any outside sponsor?.and all major decisions concerning both the kidnapping and the operations that followed originated in the Dahye."
He adds, "Hezbollah's tactics in the summer's war were tailored to the mission." And "?Hezbollah's tactics, in turn, surprised and at times exasperated the IDF."
"This kind of fight negated many of the IDF's natural advantages and forced the IDF ground forces to fight a very different kind of battle than the one for which they had trained," continues Exum. "?For the IDF, fighting an Arab military proficient in tactical manoeuvre under fire was a new experience."
In his section of the book under the title "The Antitank Battle" Exums adds: "Hezbollah made the IDF pay for every inch of ground that it took?But chalking up the disaster of Wadi Salouqi merely to Israeli incompetence ignores one of Hezbollah's great tactical successes of the July War: its use of a wide variety of antitank weapons that consistently created problems for the IDF on the ground."
In the last section of the study labelled "The Rocket Battle" Exum points out "Hezbollah's rocket attacks against Israel in the July War were at once a tactical success and a strategic failure. Tactically, Hezbollah managed to sustain a consistently heavy rate of rocket fire against northern Israel throughout the war."
"?At the same time, however, Hezbollah's rockets did not have their desired effect of breaking the will of the people of northern Israel," he adds.
"Finally, Hezbollah displayed the ability during the July War to make good use of whatever weapons systems it was provided...In the next conflict between Hezbollah and the IDF, it seems a safe bet that Hezbollah's next goal will be to break the IDF's stranglehold on the air," Exum concludes his study.
"Hezbollah at War": A Military Assessment done by Andrew Exum.
"Hezbollah at War": a military assessment which was done by the expert in The Washington Institute for Near East Policy and the former U.S Army officer Andrew Exum.
The assessment is mainly divided into three parts: Villages battle, Anti-tank battle and the Rockets battle. It also mentions Hezbollah's background, military structure, weapons and training in addition to the July War
Exum, who participated in Iraq and Afghanistan invasions, mentioned in his introduction that "what should stand out for U.S. military planners and policymakers as they study the July War is the simple fact that an army fighting with largely U.S. equipment and American-style tactics (Used by Israel) struggled greatly in its conflict with Hezbollah."
The former U.S. Army officer, who visited Lebanon and Palestine to continue his research, adds that "Hezbollah have infinitely more combat experience and acquired tactical nous than their Iranian sponsors, leading one independent observer to wryly note that Hezbollah trains Iran, not the other way around."
Exum adds that "As Hezbollah's performance during the July War illustrates, however, Hezbollah deserves to be taken seriously as a fighting force independent of any outside sponsor?.and all major decisions concerning both the kidnapping and the operations that followed originated in the Dahye."
He adds, "Hezbollah's tactics in the summer's war were tailored to the mission." And "?Hezbollah's tactics, in turn, surprised and at times exasperated the IDF."
"This kind of fight negated many of the IDF's natural advantages and forced the IDF ground forces to fight a very different kind of battle than the one for which they had trained," continues Exum. "?For the IDF, fighting an Arab military proficient in tactical manoeuvre under fire was a new experience."
In his section of the book under the title "The Antitank Battle" Exums adds: "Hezbollah made the IDF pay for every inch of ground that it took?But chalking up the disaster of Wadi Salouqi merely to Israeli incompetence ignores one of Hezbollah's great tactical successes of the July War: its use of a wide variety of antitank weapons that consistently created problems for the IDF on the ground."
In the last section of the study labelled "The Rocket Battle" Exum points out "Hezbollah's rocket attacks against Israel in the July War were at once a tactical success and a strategic failure. Tactically, Hezbollah managed to sustain a consistently heavy rate of rocket fire against northern Israel throughout the war."
"?At the same time, however, Hezbollah's rockets did not have their desired effect of breaking the will of the people of northern Israel," he adds.
"Finally, Hezbollah displayed the ability during the July War to make good use of whatever weapons systems it was provided...In the next conflict between Hezbollah and the IDF, it seems a safe bet that Hezbollah's next goal will be to break the IDF's stranglehold on the air," Exum concludes his study.



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Exum adds that "As Hezbollah's performance during the July War illustrates, however, Hezbollah deserves to be taken seriously as a fighting force independent of any outside sponsor?.and all major decisions concerning both the kidnapping and the operations that followed originated in the Dahye."